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Abstract
During his whole scientific life Hermann Weyl was fascinated by
the interrelation of physical and mathematical theories. From the mid
1920s onward he reflected also on the typical difference between the two
epistemic fields and tried to identify it by comparing their respective
automorphism structures. In a talk given at the end of the 1940s
(ETH, Hs 91a:31) he gave the most detailed and coherent discussion
of his thoughts on this topic. This paper presents his arguments in
the talk and puts it in the context of the later development of gauge
theories.
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Introduction
The English translation of Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science
(Weyl 1949), in the following quoted as PMN, gave Weyl the opportunity
to reflect once more on the relation between mathematical and physical au-
tomorphisms (often called symmetries) and its meaning for understanding
the basic features of nature. This topic had occupied Weyl during his whole
scientific life. In a talk Similarity and congruence: a chapter in the episte-
mology of science preserved in his Zürich Nachlass (Weyl Hs 1948/49) we find
a coherent balance of Weyl’s thoughts on this theme at the time 1948/49.1
Some parts of this manuscript are identical with passages in PMN, others
(but less) are close to formulations which Weyl later used in his book on
Symmetry (Weyl 1952). All in all we have here a kind of bridge text be-
tween his two famous books. Many aspects discussed in the lecture are also
present in PMN at different places and therefore not necessarily new for the
informed reader, but the concentration on the topic of mathematical versus
physical automorphisms gives the manuscript a uniqueness and coherence
which justifies a separate discussion of its content. With regard to Symme-
try the manuscript can be read as an epistemologically and physically deeper
reflection of the same considerations which lay at the base of (Weyl 1952).
The text of the lecture is going to be published in the forthcoming third
edition of the German translation (Weyl 1955).
The lecture concentrates on a topic which was of great interest to Weyl:
the question of how to distinguish between mathematical and physical auto-
morphisms in 20th century physics. It is mentioned in (Weyl 1952) and more
extensively discussed in PMN.2 In the talk it is presented as a whole and dis-
cussed with even more details than in PMN. Weyl argued more clearly for the
necessity to distinguish between the automorphism structures of mathemat-
ical and physical theories. He accentuated the difference by even speaking of
the “group of automorphisms of the physical world”. Although this sounded
like an ontological claim, Weyl’s arguments basically pursued an epistemo-
logical interest (indicated already in the title of the paper).
This contribution presents Weyl’s arguments in favour of taking automor-
phisms seriously for characterizing objectivity (section 1), his distinction be-
tween mathematical and physical automorphisms of classical geometry and
physics (section 2) and the shifts arising from general relativity (GR) and
“early” (pre 1950) quantum theory (sections 3, 4). Section 5 proposes an
interpretation of how we may express Weyl’s distinction in more general
terms; section 6 makes a first step into discussing later developments from
this perspective. At the end of his talk Weyl reflected the special nature of
the Lorentz group (generalizing the “rotations” of classical geometry) which
1The lecture is undated, but during the talk Weyl mentioned that his proposal for a
unified field theory was made “just 30 years ago”.
2(Weyl 1949, 72f., 82–84)
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had survived the transition from classical to relativistic physics (section 7).
A short outlook on later developments, not yet to be seen by Weyl at the end
of the 1940s, follows and relates Weyl’s arguments to more recent discussion
on symmetries in physics and its philosophy (section 8).
1 Automorphisms and objectivity
The talk shows how Weyl intended to demarcate the distinction between
mathematical and physical automorphism of physical theories. In classi-
cal geometry and physics, physical automorphisms could be based on the
material operations used for defining the elementary equivalence concept of
congruence (“equality and similitude” in the old terminology). But Weyl
started even more generally, with Leibniz’ explanation of the similarity of
two objects, “two things are similar if they are indiscernible when each is
considered by itself (Hs, p. 1)”,3 and remarks on the Clarke-Leibniz corre-
spondence regarding the indiscernibility of the regions in space. Here, like at
other places, Weyl endorsed this Leibnzian argument from the point of view
of “modern physics”, while adding that for Leibniz this spoke in favour of the
unsubstantiality and phenomenality of space and time. On the other hand,
for “real substances” the Leibnizian monads, indiscernability implied iden-
tity. In this way Weyl indicated, prior to any more technical consideration,
that similarity in the Leibnizian sense was the same as objective equality.
He did not enter deeper into the metaphysical discussion but insisted that
the issue discussed in his talk “is of philosophical significance far beyond its
purely geometric aspect”.
After some remarks on historical shifts of what was considered as “objec-
tive” properties, e.g. the vertical direction for Democritus or absolute space
for Newton,4 Weyl had good news: “. . . we can say today in a quite definite
manner what the adequate mathematical instrument is for the formulation
of this idea (objectivity, E.S.). It is the notion of group” (Hs, p. 4). Weyl
did not claim that this idea solves the epistemological problem of objectivity
once and for all, but at least it offers an adequate mathematical instrument
for the formulation of it. He illustrated the idea in a first step by explaining
the automorphisms of Euclidean geometry as the structure preserving bijec-
tive mappings of the point set5 underlying a structure satisfying the axioms
of “Hilbert’s classical book on the Foundations of Geometry” (Hs, p. 4f.).
He concluded that for Euclidean geometry these are the similarities, not the
congruences as one might expect at a first glance (see section 2). In the
mathematical sense, we then “come to interpret objectivity as the invariance
3A similar passage is also to be found in (Weyl 1952, 127f.). Page quotes referring to
the manuscript (Weyl Hs 1948/49) are abbreviated by (Hs, p. xx).
4For the last point see also (Weyl 1949, 100).
5Weyl preferred to avoid the language of sets and used the the terminology of a “point-
field”.
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under the group of automorphisms” (Hs., p.6, emphasis in the original).
But Weyl warned to identify mathematical objectivity with that of nat-
ural science, because once we deal with real space “neither the axioms nor
the basic relations are given” (Hs, 6). As the latter are extremely difficult
to discern, Weyl proposed to turn the tables and to take the group Γ of au-
tomorphisms, rather than the ‘basic relations’ and the corresponding relata,
as the epistemic starting point:6
Hence we come much nearer to the actual state of affairs if we
start with the group Γ of automorphisms and refrain from making
the artificial logical distinction between basic and derived rela-
tions. Once the group is known, we know what it means to say
of a relation that it is objective, namely invariant with respect
to Γ . . . (Hs, 6)
By such a well chosen constitutive stipulation it becomes clear what
objective statements are, although this can be achieved only at the price that
“. . . we start, as Dante starts in his Divina Comedia, in mezzo del camin”
(Hs. p. 7). A phrase characteristic for Weyl’s later view follows:
It is the common fate of man and his science that we do not
begin at the beginning; we find ourselves somewhere on a road
the origin and end of which are shrouded in fog (Hs, p. 6).
Weyl’s juxtaposition of the mathematical and the physical concept of
objectivity is worthwhile to reflect upon. The mathematical objectivity con-
sidered by him is relatively easy to obtain by combining the axiomatic char-
acterization of a mathematical theory (Hilbert) with the epistemic postulate
of invariance under a group of automorphisms (Klein). Both are constituted
in a series of acts characterized by Weyl in PMN as symbolic construction,
which is free in several regards. For example, the group of automorphisms
of Euclidean geometry may be expanded by “the mathematician” in rather
wide ways (affine, projective, or even “any group of transformations”).7 In
each case a specific realm of mathematical objectivity is constituted. With
the example of the automorphism group Γ of (plane) Euclidean geometry in
6In this context the “basic relations” might be interpreted as the laws of nature. For
readers who prefer to use the more concrete sounding word symmetries to “automor-
phisms”, Weyl’s proposal may be read as the advice to take the symmetries as epistemic
starting point and the laws/equations invariant under this group as epistemically sec-
ondary (derived). Note that Weyl did not pose the question in terms of which of the two
levels is more fundamental (see the quote below).
7For Weyl “any group” was usually constrained by the condition of differentiability.
This was not necessarily so for other mathematicians, see e.g. F. Hausdorff’s argument
for the lack of meaning of an “absolute” objective structure of space and time in his philo-
sophical essay Das Chaos in kosmischer Auslese in which arbitrary point transformation
(bijections) are considered as the most general case (Hausdorff 1898); see (Epple 2006).
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mind Weyl explained a little later how, through the use of Cartesian coordi-
nates, the automorphisms of Euclidean geometry can be represented by linear
transformations “in terms of reproducible numerical symbols” (Hs, p.9).
For natural science the situation is quite different; here the freedom of
the constitutive act is severely restricted. Weyl described the constraint for
the choice of Γ at the outset in very general terms:
The physicist will question Nature to reveal him her true group
of automorphisms (Hs, p. 7).
This is a striking, even surprising remark. Different to what a philoso-
pher might expect, Weyl did not mention, at this place, the subtle influences
induced by theoretical evaluations of empirical insights on the constitutive
choice of the group of automorphisms for a physical theory. He even did
not restrict the consideration to the range of a physical theory but aimed at
Nature as a whole. Still in 1948/49, after several turns of his own views and
radical changes in the fundamental views of theoretical physics, Weyl hoped
for an insight into the true group of automorphisms of Nature without any
further specifications. Of course he did not stop with this general charac-
terization. In the following parts of the talk Weyl explored in much more
detail how the “true group” of physical automorphisms was shaped with the
increasing and deepening empirical and theoretical knowledge of nature.
2 Physical and mathematical automorphisms of classical geometry
Looking at classical geometry and mechanics, Weyl followed Newton and
Helmholtz in considering congruence as the basic relation which lay at the
heart of the “art of measuring” by the handling of that “sort of bodies we call
rigid” (Hs, p. 9). In a short passage he explained how the local congruence
relations established by the comparison of rigid bodies can be generalized and
abstracted to congruences of the whole space. In this respect Weyl followed
an empiricist approach to classical physical geometry, based on a theoretical
extension of the material practice with rigid bodies and their motions. Even
the mathematical abstraction to mappings of the whole space carried the
mark of their empirical origin and was restricted to the group of proper
congruences (orientation preserving isometries of Euclidean space, generated
by the translations and rotations) denoted by him as ∆`. This group seems
to express “an intrinsic structure of space itself; a structure stamped by space
upon all the inhabitants of space” (Hs, p. 10). From a historical perspective,
∆` could serve as the group of physical automorphisms of space until the
early 19th century. As we shall see in a moment, Weyl argued that during
the 19th century it would be extended to the group of all congruences ∆
which also includes the orientation reversing isometries (point symmetries,
reflections).
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But already on the earlier level of physical knowledge, so Weyl argued,
the mathematical automorphisms of space were larger than ∆. Even if one
sees “with Newton, in congruence the one and only basic concept of geometry
from which all others derive” (Hs, p. 10), the group Γ of automorphisms in
the mathematical sense turns out to be constituted by the similarities.
The structural condition for an automorphism C P Γ of classical con-
gruence geometry is that any pair pv1, v2q of congruent geometric configu-
rations is transformed into another pair pv˚
1
, v˚
2
q of congruent configurations
(v˚j “ Cpvjq, j “ 1, 2). For evaluating this property Weyl introduced the
following diagram:
v1 v2
v˚
1
v˚
2
.....................................................
..
pT q
...
...
...
...
...
...
..
...
...
...
.......
pC´1q
................................
....
pCq
Because of the condition for automorphisms just mentioned the maps CTC´1
and C´1TC belong to ∆` whenever T does. By this argument he showed
that the mathematical automorphism group Γ is the normalizer of the con-
gruences ∆` in the group of bijective mappings of Euclidean space.8
This argument contained the mathematical reason for Weyl’s decision in
1918 to consider the similarities as the structure determining morphisms of
his purely infinitesimal geometry (Weyl 1918b). More generally, it also ex-
plains the reason for his characterization of generalized similarities in his
analysis of the problem of space in the early 1920s. In 1918 he translated
the relationship between physical equivalences as congruences to the mathe-
matical automorphisms as the similarities/normalizer of of the congruences
from classical geometry to special relativity (Minkowski space) and “local-
ized” them (in the sense of physics), i.e., he transferred the structural re-
lationship to the infinitesimal neighbourhoods of the differentiable manifold
characterizing spacetime (in more recent language, to the tangent spaces)
and developed what later would be called Weylian manifolds, a generaliza-
tion of Riemannian geometry.9 In his discussion of the problem of space he
generalized the same relationship even further by allowing any (closed) sub-
group of the general linear group as a candidate for characterizing generalized
congruences at every point.
8The same argument is given in (Weyl 1949, 79).
9In 1918 Weyl even hoped that the extension to the similarities was not only relevant
from a mathematical point of view, but also plays a crucial role for physics (by incorpo-
rating electromagnetism into the geometrical structure field and leading to a unified field
theory). In his terminology of 1948/49 he had hoped that his generalization of Rieman-
nian geometry to Weylian manifolds of 1918 corresponded to an extension of the physical
automorphisms of general relativity. In the transition to the “new” quantum mechanics in
the 1920s he gave up this hope; see his corresponding remarks below.
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Moreover, Weyl argued that the enlargement of the physico-geometrical
automorphisms of classical geometry (proper congruences) by the mathe-
matical automorphisms (similarities) sheds light on Kant’s riddle of the “in-
congruous counterparts”. Weyl presented it as the question: Why are “incon-
gruous counterparts” like the left and right hands intrinsically indiscernible,
although they cannot be transformed into another by a proper motion? From
his point of view the intrinsic indiscernibility could be characterized by the
mathematical automorphisms Γ. Of course, the congruences ∆ including the
reflections are part of the latter, ∆ Ă Γ; this implies indiscernibility between
“left and right” as a special case. In this way Kant’s riddle was solved by a
Leibnizian type of argument. Weyl very cautiously indicated a philosophical
implication of this observation
And he (Kant, E.S.) is inclined to think that only transcendental
idealism is able to solve this riddle. No doubt, the meaning of
congruence and similarity is founded in spatial intuition. Kant
seems to aim at some subtler point. But just this point is one
which can be completely clarified by general concepts, namely
by subsuming it under the general and typical group-theoretic
situation explained before . . . (Hs. p. 7).
Weyl stopped here without discussing the relationship between group theo-
retical methods and the “subtler point” Kant aimed at more explicitly. But
we may read this remark as an indication that he considered his reflections
on automorphism groups as a contribution to the transcendental analysis
of the conceptual constitution of modern science. For Weyl this meant, of
course, modern science in the sense of the 20th century, i.e., taking general
relativity and quantum physics into account. A little later, in his book on
Symmetry, he went a tiny step further. Still with the Weylian restraint re-
garding the discussion of philosophical principles he stated: “As far as I see
all a priori statements in physics have their origin in symmetry” (Weyl 1952,
126).
To prepare for the following, Weyl specified the subgroup ∆o Ă ∆ with
all those transformations that fix one point (∆o “ Op3,Rq, the orthogonal
group in 3 dimensions, R the field of real numbers). In passing he remarked:
In the four-dimensional world the Lorentz group takes the place
of the orthogonal group. But here I shall restrict myself to the
three-dimensional space, only occasionally pointing to the mod-
ifications, the inclusion of time into the four-dimensional world
brings about. (Hs, p. 13f.)
Keeping this caveat in mind (restriction to three-dimensional space) Weyl
characterized the ”group of automorphisms of the physical world”, in the sense
of classical physics (including quantum mechanics) by the combination (more
7
technically, the semidirect product ¸) of translations and rotations, while
the mathematical automorphisms arise from a normal extension:
– physical automorphisms ∆ – R3 ¸∆o with ∆o – Op3q,
respectively ∆ – R4 ¸∆o for the Lorentz group ∆o – Op1, 3q,
– mathematical automorphisms Γ “ R` ˆ∆
(R` the positive real numbers with multiplication).
In Weyl’s view the difference between mathematical and physical auto-
morphisms established a fundamental distinction between mathematical ge-
ometry and physics.
Congruence, or physical equivalence, is a geometric concept, the
meaning of which refers to the laws of physical phenomena; the
congruence group ∆ is essentially the group of physical automor-
phisms. If we interpret geometry as an abstract science dealing
with such relations and such relations only as can be logically de-
fined in terms of the one concept of congruence, then the group
of geometric automorphisms is the normalizer of ∆ and hence
wider than ∆. (Hs, p. 16f., emphasis E.S.)
He considered this as a striking argument against what he considered to be
the Cartesian program of a reductionist geometrization of physics (physics
as the science of res extensa):
According to this conception, Descartes’s program of reducing
physics to geometry would involve a vicious circle, and the fact
that the group of geometric automorphisms is wider than that
of physical automorphisms would show that such a reduction is
actually impossible.” (Hs, p. 16f., similar in (Weyl 1949, 83))
In this Weyl alluded to an illusion he himself had shared for a short time as
a young scientist. After the creation of his gauge geometry in 1918 and the
proposal of a geometrically unified field theory of electromagnetism and grav-
ity he believed, for a short while, to have achieved a complete geometrization
of physics.10
10In the third German edition of Space - Time - Matter (1919) Weyl included his pro-
posal for a unified field and matter theory. At the end of the book he drew the following
conclusion:
We have realized that physics and geometry collaps to one, that the world
metric is a physical reality, and even the only one. In the end, the whole
physical reality appears to be a mere form; not geometry has become phys-
icalized, but physics has turned into geometry. (Weyl 1919, 263, my trans-
lation, E.S.)
(“Wir hatten erkannt, daß Physik und Geometrie schließlich zusammenfallen, daß die
Weltmetrik eine, ja vielmehr die physikalische Realität ist. Aber letzten Endes erscheint
8
He gave up this illusion in the middle of the 1920s under the impression of
the rising quantum mechanics. In his own contribution to the new quantum
mechanics groups and their linear representations played a crucial role. In
this respect the mathematical automorphisms of geometry and the physical
automorphisms “of Nature”, or more precisely the automorphisms of physical
systems, moved even further apart, because now the physical automorphism
started to take non-geometrical material degrees of freedom into account
(phase symmetry of wave functions and, already earlier, the permutation
symmetries of n-particle systems).
But already during the 19th century the physical automorphism group
had acquired a far deeper aspect than that of the mobility of rigid bodies:
In physics we have to consider not only points but many types of
physical quantities such as velocity, force, electromagnetic field
strength, etc. . . .
All these quantities can be represented, relative to a Cartesian frame, by
sets of numbers such that any orthogonal transformation T performed on the
coordinates keeps the basic physical relations, the physical laws, invariant.
Weyl accordingly stated:
All the laws of nature are invariant under the transformations
thus induced by the group ∆. Thus physical relativity can be
completely described by means of a group of transformations of
space-points. (Hs. p. 14, emphasis in orginal)
By this argumentation Weyl described a deep shift which ocurred in
the late 19th century for the understanding of physics. He described it as
an extension of the group of physical automorphisms. The laws of physics
(“basic relations” in his more abstract terminology above) could no longer
be directly characterized by the motion of rigid bodies because the physics
of fields, in particular of electric and magnetic fields, had become central.
In this context, the motions of material bodies lost their epistemological
primary status and the physical automorphisms acquired a more abstract
character, although they were still completely characterizable in geometric
terms, by the full group of Euclidean isometries. The indistinguishability of
left and right, observed already in clear terms by Kant, acquired the status
of a physical symmetry in electromagnetism and in crystallography.11
so diese ganze physikalische Realität doch als eine bloße Form; nicht die Geometrie ist zur
Physik, sondern die Physik zur Geometrie geworden.”)
In the next years, and already in the following editions of Space - Time - Matter, Weyl
withdrew step by step from this geometrization of physics perspective. In his Rouse Ball
lecture 1930 he likened it with premature “geometrical jumps into the air (geometrische
Luftsprünge)” which had lost contact with the “solid ground of physical facts” (of quantum
physical observations) (Weyl 1931, 343).
11In geometrical crystallography the point inversion symmetry played a crucial role
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Weyl thus insisted that in classical physics the physical automorphisms
could be characterized by the group ∆ of Euclidean isometries, larger than
the physical congruences (proper motions) ∆` but smaller than the mathe-
matical automorphisms (similarities) Γ.12
This view fitted well to insights which Weyl drew from recent develop-
ments in quantum physics. He insisted – differently to what he had thought
in 1918 – on the consequence that “length is not relative but absolute” (Hs,
p. 15). He argued that physical length measurements were no longer depen-
dent on an arbitrary chosen unit, like in Euclidean geometry. An “absolute
standard of length” could be fixed by the quantum mechanical laws of the
atomic shell:
The atomic constants of charge and mass of the electron atomic
constants and Planck’s quantum of action h, which enter the
universal field laws of nature, fix an absolute standard of length,
that through the wave lengths of spectral lines is made available
for practical measurements. (Hs, 15, emphasis E.S.)
This statement was important for Weyl; he repeated the passage in
(Weyl 1949, 83) and (Weyl 1952, 129) in similar words. It demarcates a
crucial difference of Weyl’s mature view of the physical metric from his ear-
lier ones (1918 until about 1924). In the terminology of his 1918 debate with
Einstein, Weyl came now to accept that the laws of quantum physics and the
constitution of the atom establish a kind of “universal bureau of standards
(Eichamt)”, contrary to what pure field physics made him expect in 1918.13
3 The ’shock of relativity’
“So far so good. But now comes the shock of general relativity theory. It
taught us that the group of physical automorphisms is much larger than we
had assumed so far . . . ” (Hs, p. 16). With these words Weyl turned towards
already a short time after Kant’s death and was developed during the 19th century in
both, the atomistic and the dynamistic, programs of crystallography. With the transition
to group theoretic descriptions of crystallographic symmetries the extension of proper
motions by orientation reversing isometries was made explicit between Camille Jordan’s
paper of 1869 Mémoire sur les groupes de mouvements and Sohncke’s adaptation in crys-
tallographic studies to Schoenflies’ papers on crystallographic groups in 1888ff. under the
influence of F. Klein (Scholz 1989, chap. I).
12Similar arguments can be found in (Weyl 1949, 83) and (Weyl 1952, 129). The
argument was apparently meant to hold, mutatis mutandis, also for special relativistic
physics (“. . . only occasionally pointing to the modifications, the inclusion of time into the
four-dimensional world brings about”).
13In this context it is interesting to see that the International System of Standards (SI)
is now substituting the pragmatic convention of the Paris urmeter by implementing a fixed
standard of length on the basis of the ground state hyperfine splitting frequency of the
caesium 133 atom and reference to a collection of natural constants (velocity of light c,
Planck constant ~, elementary charge e, Boltzmann, Avogadro and Rydberg constants).
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the shift general relativity brought about for the understanding of mathemat-
ical and physical automorphisms of geometry, or even “Nature” as such. He
described the mathematical structure of differentiable and Riemannian man-
ifolds by means of coordinate systems and characterized the tangent spaces
by point dependent “Cartesian” (orthonormal) vector bases. This descrip-
tion of orthonormal frames was a simplification of a method for generalizing
Dirac’s electron theory to the general relativistic context (Weyl 1929).14
Weyl described the automorphism group of general relativity verbally,
i.e., without formulae, as containing “all transformations (satisfying certain
continuity or differentiability restrictions)” (Hs, p. 16), i.e., the diffeomor-
phisms of the space(-time) manifold M . A little later he characterized this
part of the physical automorphism group (sloppily) by its expression in co-
ordinates and talked about
. . . . . . the group Ω of all coordinate transformations, which ex-
presses the generally relativistic molluscous nature of space as
the ‘field of possible coincidences’ (Hs, p. 18).
In addition, the different choices of orthonormal frames at each point of the
manifold are associated to point dependent “rotations” of type ∆o (orthog-
onal, or Lorentz transformations). They have to be taken into account for
transforming between different pictures of a general relativistic field constel-
lation. Thus:
The laws of nature are independent of the arbitrariness involved
in these two acts. In other words, they are invariant (1) with re-
spect to arbitrary continuous (or rather differentiable) coordinate
transformations, (2) with respect to any rotation of the Cartesian
frame at P , a rotation that may depend in an arbitrary manner
on the point P . (Hs, p. 18)
On a first reading two, or even three, features of Weyl’s characteriza-
tion of the repercussions of the “shock of relativity” on the perception of
the physical automorphisms may appear puzzling. He did not specify, at
least not in general terms, what the “independence of the arbitrariness” un-
der the respective choices of coordinates and frames precisely meant for the
natural laws. At a superficial glance his characterization may seem to be
subject to Kretschmann’s criticism of the meaning of general covariance for
general relativity. But Weyl made it quite clear that he understood the in-
variance of the laws of nature under the physical automorphisms in a strong
sense, i.e, without assuming an additional background structure (e.g. the
Euclidean metric in the case of Newtonian mechanics) which would have to
be transformed concomitantly with the dynamical quantities appearing in
14Similarly in (Weyl 1949, 88), while the following discussion of physical automorphisms
is much more detailed in the talk (Hs, pp. 16ff.).
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the natural laws.15 Following Einstein in this regard, Weyl expressed this
idea for general relativity in clear terms:
The metric structure, and the inertial structure derived from it,
exert a powerful influence upon all physical phenomena. But
what acts must also suffer. In other words, the metric structure
must be conceived as something variable, like matter and like the
electromagnetic field, which stands with all other physical quan-
tities in the commerce of interaction: it acts and suffers reactions.
Only by admitting the metrical field as a variable physical entity
among the other physical quantities can the principle of general
relativity be carried through. (Hs, p. 16)
The second puzzling feature is Weyl’s rather generous quid pro quo of dif-
ferentiable coordinate transformations and diffeomorphisms of the manifold,
mentioned already above. But this was a general way of expressing diffeo-
morphisms by Weyl. He did not like transfinite sets, and therefore tended
to avoid the description of manifolds by locally Euclidean Hausdorff spaces
endowed with what later would be called an atlas of coordinate systems. He
rather preferred a definition by equivalences of coordinate domains, because
he considered this a more constructive approach to the concept of mani-
fold. This being said, we need not bother much about this peculiar mode of
expression in our context.
The third puzzling feature relates to Weyl’s treatment of the localized,
point dependent operation of the (Lorentz) orthogonal group on the tangent
spaces. This aspect deserves more attention.
4 Automorphisms of general relativity as a gauge group
Weyl dealt her with what later would be called a gauge group or, more pre-
cisely, a gauge automorphism group over spacetime M with structure group
G “ ∆o. The situation is complicated by different uses of the term gauge
group in the present literature. In fibre bundle language, referring to a prin-
cipal fibre bundle G ü P Ñ M over the base manifold M with structure
group G, some authors consider the group GP of fibrewise (“vertically”) op-
erating bundle automorphisms as the gauge group of P . The elements of GP
are called (global) gauge transformations.
In another, more general, view the group GpP q of all (equivariant) bundle
automorphisms is considered as the gauge group of P . In order to disam-
biguate the terminology, the elements of GpP qmight better be called (bundle)
15This difference is sometimes considered as the crucial difference between symmetries of
the laws and covariance of the equations of motion, see (Giulini 2009) or the commentary
by the same author in the 3rd edition of (Weyl 1955).
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automorphisms,16 and GpP q the group of gauge automorphisms. Different
from the first definition, the elements of GpP q allow diffeomorphic transfor-
mations of the base. In our context the latter definition is more appropriate,
because it expresses Weyl’s description of the automorphism group of general
relativity in modernized terms.
To make things even more involved, one often speaks of gauge trans-
formations for describing the local changes of trivialization of a given fibre
bundle, including their operation on the local representatives of connections.
This last reading of gauge transformations corresponds to a local realiza-
tions of the vertical gauge transformations in the sense of GP , just like the
differentiable coordinate transformations correspond to diffeomorphisms of
a manifold.
The physical automorphism group of general relativity, intuitively de-
scribed by Weyl as composed by two components (Ω and the family of point
dependent ∆o-s) would have been difficult to formulate at the end of the
1940s. But already a few years later, in the early 1950s, the next genera-
tion of mathematicians learned to describe such a group GpP q by a principle
fibre bundle P over M , P ÝÑ M with structure group G – ∆o.
17 The
latter describes both, the fibres of P and their allowable transformations
(G operates fibrewise on P ). As GpP q consists of the diffeomorphisms of
the bundle P , which induce diffeomorphisms on the base manifold M and
map the fibres in such a way that the group operations are respected, it
formalizes Weyl’s intuition of the liberty of choice of a local reference system
(orthogonal frame) at every point quite well.18 An element of GpP q induces
a local diffeomorphism of the base manifold M and, moreover, it specifies an
orthogonal transformation at each point of M . This corresponds to a point
dependent change of frames in Weyl’s description. Therefore GpP q is a well
adapted modernized (and only minimally anachronistic) global expression
for Weyl’s automorphism group of general relativity.
Weyl compared the new group with the automorphisms of special relativ-
ity or even classical physics. The translations of the classical automorphism
group were generalized by the diffeomorphism group Ω and the “rotations”
(Lorentz transformations) became point dependent.
But this was only a first step into modernity, not yet the final word. For
16This is the terminology in, e.g., (Bleecker. 1981, 46). I thank an anonymous referee
for the literature hint.
17Norman Steenrod, since 1947 at the faculty of Princeton University, and the Stras-
bourg group of differential geometers about Charles Ehresmann played a crucial role for
this development. Ehresmann was a student of E. Cartan and had been in close contact
with Weyl during his time at Göttingen (1930/1931) and again in Princeton from 1932 to
1934 (Zisman 1999).
18After a choice of a local frame a numerical representation of the (Lorentz) orthogonal
is specified, and the operation of the orthogonal group is “trivialized”. A change of frames
leads to another representation arising from the first one by conjugation (in modernized
terminology a local change of trivialization).
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the generalization of the Dirac theory to general relativity it turned out to
be necessary (and in Weyl’s view also natural) to extend the structure group
∆o by a complex phase factor to ∆˜o – ∆o ˆ Up1q. Weyl indicated this step
by the transition to a (2-component) spinor representation of the rotation
group (resp. Lorentz group) and added that the latter was underdetermined
by a complex factor of norm 1:
The two components ψ1, ψ2 of the electronic wave field have the
peculiarity that they are determined by the local frame f only
up to an arbitrary factor α “ eiλ of modulus 1. The real λ could
be described as a common shift of phase in the two complex
quantities ψ1, ψ2. This gauge factor α adds one more parameter
to the representing group of transformations . . . (Hs, p. 20)
This extension leads to a general relativistic theory of the electron field,
which had been proposed independently by Weyl and V. Fock in 1929.19
In modernized description Weyl finally considered the gauge automorphisms
GpP q of a bundle
∆o ˆ Up1q – ∆˜o ü P ÑM (1)
constructed over spacetimeM (considered as a Lorentz manifold) by extend-
ing the orthogonal frame bundle as the physical automorphisms of (phase
extended) general relativity.
He indicated that the new automorphism group corresponds to important
conservation principles and/or structure theorems of physics: conservation
of energy and momentum correspond to the coordinate transformations of
spacetime, symmetry of the energy tensor to the point-dependent “rotations”
(HS, p. 19). The first part of this remark should not be taken literally; it
is (overly) simplified. While the second part of the statement (symmetry of
energy tensor) is a consequence of the rotational symmetries of the automor-
phism group, the conservation of energy/momentum is more problematic. It
makes sense in special relativity and under restriction to the Poincaré group,
or more generally under strong homogeneity conditions of spacetime and a
restriction to adapted frames of reference; in the general case the conserved
quantities exist mathematically (Noether currents) but do not allow a coor-
dinate and observer independent physical interpretation. Weyl had discussed
this point more precisely in his 1929-paper; here he simplified it, probably
for didactical reasons, a bit too strongly.20
The justification of the attribute “physical” for the diffeomorphism com-
ponent of the automorphism group of general relativity is therefore more
subtle than admitted here by Weyl. But he had given another necessary
19(Vizgin 1994, Straumann 2001, Scholz 2005).
20Weyl touched the problematics of the Noether theorems, without quoting Noether.
For establishment, reception and philosophical discussion of the Noether theorems see
(Kosmann-Schwarzbach 2011, Rowe 1999, Brading 2005, Sus 2016).
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criterion for their physicality earlier (Hs. p. 16): the invariance of the laws
of nature, which included the invariance of the Lagrangian density for a field
theory like Einstein gravity, without any covariant non-dynamical background
structure (see above) – a subtle characterization of physicality indeed.
The simplified discussion of conservation of energy/momentum made it
easier to emphasize the physcial role of the phase gauge invariance of elec-
tromagnetism. After the rather formal introduction of the phase extension
of the structure group ∆˜o – ∆o ˆ Up1q, Weyl announced:
The law of conservation of charge corresponds to it [phase invari-
ance, E.S.] in the same manner as the law of the conservation
of energy-momentum corresponds to the invariance under coor-
dinate transformations. (Hs, p. 20)
This feature was of particular importance for Weyl’s 1929 extension of the
automorphism group of general relativity. It is, in fact, less problematic than
the energy conservation statement mentioned above.21
On the other hand, the “gauging” of phase (the choice of a local trivializa-
tion in mathematical language) relied on a completely abstract, symbolical
choice; the same holds for the localized phase transformations. While gaug-
ing the (Lorentz) orthogonal group could still be understood as a choice of
frames, i.e. as a result of a choice of observer systems with point dependent
relative motions, and the gauging of Weyl’s 1918 scale group could be un-
derstood as as point dependent choice of units of measurement, the gauging
of phase was emptied of any direct empirical content, it became “descriptive
fluff” (Earman 2004). This poses the question in which respect Weyl’s talk of
“physical automorphisms” deals with more than a bunch of transformations
of descriptive fluff.
The answer was already indicated by Weyl by emphasizing the invariance
of physical laws (without non-dynamical covariant background structure)
and the reference to conserved quantities or structural consequences of what
would later become known as conserved Noether currents. In the language
of fibre bundles we may rephrase Weyl’s argument by calling to attention
that the gauge automorphism group GpP q operates on the whole system of
dynamical variables in a way which allows to deal with the invariance of the
“laws of nature” (in particular the Lagrangian densities in case of Lagrangian
field theories) in a mathematically precise way without introducing new non-
dynamical background features. This allows to decide whether a given group
consists of automorphisms of the theory and gives a necessary condition for
the latter’s “physicality” (background independence); but it does not yet give
a sufficient criterion. We may still be able to extend the bundle of a given
physically meaningful structure by a new symmetry and a hypothetical new
21The reason lies in the specific structure of the phase gauge extension; see (Brading
2002).
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dynamical field which avoids the appearance of a non-dynamical background
structure.22 The crucial question is as to whether or not the extension of
the structure as a whole, not every single field in isolation, leads to new
physical insight. This may be of any kind, conservation laws are only the
most prominent example.
Weyl’s proposal of 1918 for introducing a metrical (point-dependent)
scale gauge invariance as a fundamental symmetry of electromagnetism was
substituted by a point-dependent phase choice. He discussed the transition
in some detail and emphasized that in the “old theory” the unit of the elec-
tromagnetic potential was related to Einstein’s cosmological constant, while
in the new theory the potential was “measured not in an unknown cosmo-
logical, but in a known atomic unit” (Hs, p. 21). Moreover, quantum theory
seemed to speak for the existence of an “absolute standard of length” (by
fixing the frequency of atomic clocks, see above); he therefore concluded:
I have no doubt that my old speculative theory has to be given
up in favor of the quantum mechanical principle of phase invari-
ance, that rests on sound empirical foundations. The facts of
atomism teach us that length is not relative but absolute, and
that the origin for the standard of length must be sought not in
the cosmos as a whole, but in the elementary material particles.
The additional group parameter is not geometric dilatation, but
electronic phase shift. I was on the right track in 1918 as far as
the formalism of gauge invariance is concerned. But the ψ’s on
which to hang the gauge factor α were utterly unknown at that
time, and so I wrongly hitched it on to Einstein’s gravitational
potentials gik. (Hs, p. 21f.)
Weyl definitely no longer considered the scale invariance of 1918 to be of
physical relevance. After 1929 he saw its status reduced to being part of
the mathematical automorphisms of general relativity, while the physical
automorphisms were extended to include a “gauged” (point-dependent) phase
symmetry.
5 Weyl’s distinction in the context of gauge structures
In this passage Weyl attributed different epistemic qualities to two possible
extensions ∆˜o “ ∆o ˆ H of the structure group (here ∆o the orthogonal
group) by abelian factors H “ Up1q (phase) or H “ R` (scale). The dis-
tinction sheds light on the central topic of the talk because the first one lead
22A good example is the reintroduction of Weyl’s scale symmetry into gravity by Utiyma
and Dirac in the early 1970s. They added a hypothetical scale covariant scalar field
coupled to the Hilbert term, similar to the Jordan-Brans-Dicke theory, and endowed it
with a kinetic term of its own (Weyl geometric scalar tensor theory).
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to an extension of the physical automorphisms of general relativity, while the
second one appeared as an extension of the mathematical automorphisms
only. This was a nice analogy to the relationship between congruences and
similarities in the classical case. But Weyl avoided to give an explicit and
general description of the demarcation between the physical and the math-
ematical automorphisms of “Nature”.
On the other hand, Weyl developed different aspects and criteria for the
distinction he was after in his case by case discussion of three different phases
in the development of modern physics (early modern, late 19th century, early
20th century). In the following we try to distill the principles underlying
the case-bound criteria which served Weyl for his distinction in in a more
general and explicit form. Then we can see whether they tell us something
about other theoretical developments, partly contemporary to Weyl but not
dicussed in his talk, like Einstein-Cartan gravity, but also about later ones
like Sciama-Kibble and Utiyma-Dirac gravity. Maybe they even can enrich
the philosophical debate on the gauge theories of the standard model of
elementary particle physics.
I propose the following generalization and interpretation: In principle
any normal extension Am of a given automorphism group Ao may constitute
a new level of mathematical objectivity for “the mathematician”, if it leaves
some interesting structure invariant. For a theory aiming at physical objec-
tivity, on the other hand, the automorphisms have to be constrained to the
largest subgroup Ap Ă Am which satisfies the following criteria:
(i) Basic physical relations (“laws of nature”) are invariant under Ap.
(ii) There are no non-dynamical background structures (no “absolute” ele-
ments).
(iii) All degrees of freedom of Ap have some physically meaningful, per-
haps even striking, consequence for the theory as a whole. Such conse-
quences may consist in a crucial heuristic role of Ap for determining the
principles underlying the “laws of nature”, e.g. in decisive constraints
for the Lagrange density.
Criterion (iii) has been vaguely formulated, because it may be realized by
quite different types of consequences. The most prominent ones, beside
the symmetry constraint for the Lagrangian, are the Noether equations of
the respective symmetries which may lead to empirically relevant conserved
quantities (Noether charge paradigm). But this type is not the only one;
there may be other consequences of a more structural nature.
InWeyl’s discussion this was the case for the rotational degrees of freedom
of his physical automorphism (1); these implied the symmetry of the energy-
momentum tensor rather than a conserved charge. In addition, Weyl’s ar-
gument for the physical character of the diffeomorphism component in the
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base manifold of (1) by hinting at the conservation of energy and momentum
has to be taken cum grano salis, because the conserved Noether charges of
the diffeomorphism degrees of freedom cannot be given an empirically rele-
vant meaning without assuming special conditions, e.g. asymptotic flatness
(cf. footnote 20). On the other hand, the postulate of diffeomorphism in-
variance constrains the choice of the Lagrangian for “the metric structure,
and the inertial structure derived from it” (Hs, p. 16, quote above); it leads
to the Hilbert action plus a constant term which may, but need not, vanish.
Therefore the diffeomorphisms are clearly part of the physical automorphism
group of general relativity.
6 A side glance at other gauge theories
From a more recent point of view, we may add that in the standard model
of elementary particle physics the most important physical insight of the un-
derlying gauge structures, in addition to the symmetry constraint for the
Lagrangians, consists in the property of renormalizability. The Noether
equations do not lead to empirically relevant conserved quantities; but un-
der quantization they develop a structural effect (“Slavnov-Taylor identies”)
which is crucial for the renormalizability of the theories. They thus establish
a crucial precondition for the empirical relevance of the theory. Weyl often
insisted on the necessity for comparing a theory with the respective segment
of “the world” only as a whole. For him, the “physicality” of automorphisms
could be established by features of a much more general nature than one
might expect from a strictly empiricist point of view. Perhaps his concep-
tion may shed light on the discussion in the present literature on philosophy
of physics why, or even whether, gauge transformations may be of physical
significance, if taking into account that gauge transformations seem to deal
with nothing more than “descriptive fluff”.
Before we come to the specific Weylian point, we have to remember that
gauge transformations appear of primarily descriptive nature only if we con-
sider them in their function as changes of local (in the mathematical sense)
changes of trivializations. In this function they are comparable to the trans-
formations of the coordinates in a differentiable manifold, which also seem
to have a purely “descriptive” function. But the coordinate changes stand in
close relation to (local) diffeomorphisms, like in Weyl’s argumentation above.
Therefore the postulate of coordinate independence of natural laws, or of the
Lagrangian density, can and is being restated in terms of diffeomorphism in-
variance in general relativity. Similarly, the local changes of trivializations
may be read as local descriptions of elements of GP in the notation above,
i.e., as fibrewise operations of gauge automorphisms. GP is a subgroup of
the more general gauge automorphism group GpP q which includes transfor-
mations of the base like in Weyl’s discussion; it thus reflects an important
part of the structural features of the bundle G ü P ÑM .
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The question as to whether or not the automorphisms of GP , or even
of GpP q, express crucial physical properties (item (iii) above) has nothing
to do with the specific gauge nature of the groups, but hinges on the more
overarching question of physical adequateness and physical content of the
theory. The question of whether or why gauge symmetries can express phys-
ical content is not much different from the Kretschmann question of whether
or why coordinate invariance of the laws, respectively coordinate covariance
description of a physical theory, can have physical content. In the latter case
the answer to the question has been dealt with in the philosophy of physics
literature in great detail. Weyl’s contribution to both levels of the debate,
the original Kretschmann question and the gauge symmetry question has
been described above; his answer is contained in his thoughts on the distinc-
tion of physical and mathematical automorphisms. In our rephrasing they
are basically covered by (iii).
Let us shed a side-glance at gravitational gauge theories not taken into ac-
count by Weyl in his talk. In Einstein-Cartan gravity, which later turned out
to be equivalent to Kibble-Sciama gravity, the localized rotational degrees of
freedom lead to a conserved spin current and a non-symmetric energy ten-
sor.23 This is a structurally pleasing effect, fitting roughly into the Noether
charge paradigm, although with a peculiar “crossover” of the two Noether
currents and the currents feeding the r.h.s of the dynamical equations, inher-
ited from Einstein gravity and Cartan’s identification of translational curva-
ture with torsion. The rotational current, spin, feeds the dynamical equa-
tion of translational curvature; the translational current, energy-momentum,
feeds the rotational curvature in the (generalized) Einstein equation.24 Ac-
cording to the experts it may acquire physical relevance only if energy densi-
ties surpass the order of magnitude 1038 times the density of neutron stars.25
By this reason the current cannot yet be considered a physically striking ef-
fect. It may turn into one, if gravitational fields corresponding to extremely
high energy densities acquire empirical relevance. For the time being, the
rotational current can safely be neglected, Einstein-Cartan gravity reduces
effectively to Einstein gravity, and Weyl’s argument for the symmetry of the
energy-momentum tensor remains the most “striking consequence” in the
sense of (iii) for the rotational degrees of freedom.
On the other hand, the translational degrees of freedom give a more
direct expression for the Noether currents of energy-momentum than the
diffeomorphisms. The physical consequences for the diffeomorphism degrees
of freedom reduce to the invariance constraint for the Lagrangian density for
Einstein gravity considered as a special case of the Einstein-Cartan theory
(with effectively vanishing spin). Besides these minor shifts, it may be more
23(Trautman 2006, Hehl 2016).
24(Hehl 2016, sec. 9, 10)
25(Blagojević/Hehl 2012, p. 108), (Trautman 2006, 194).
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interesting to realize that the approach of Kibble and Sciama agreed nicely
with Weyl’s methodological remark that for understanding nature we better
“start with the group Γ of automorphisms and refrain from making the arti-
ficial logical distinction between basic and derived relations . . . ” (Hs. 6, see
above, sec. 1). This describes quite well what Sciama and Kibble did. They
started to explore the consequences of localizing (in the physical sense) the
translational and rotational degrees of freedom of special relativity. Their
theory was built around the generalized automorphism group arising from
localizing the Poincaré group.
7 The enduring role of the Lorentz group
At the end of his talk Weyl pondered on the reasons why the structure group
of the physical automorphisms still contained the “Euclidean rotation group”
(respectively the Lorentz group, E.S.) in such a prominent role:
The Euclidean group of rotations has survived even such radical
changes of our concepts of the physical world as general relativity
and quantum theory. What then are the peculiar merits of this
group to which it owes its elevation to the basic group pattern of
the universe? For what ‘sufficient reasons’ did the Creator choose
this group and no other?” (Hs, 22)
He reminded his audience that Helmholtz had characterized ∆o – SOp3,Rq)
by the “fact that it gives to a rotating solid what we may call its just degrees
of freedom” of a rotating solid body;26 but this method “breaks down for
the Lorentz group that in the four-dimensional world takes the place of the
orthogonal group in 3-space” (Hs, p. 22). In the early 1920s he himself had
given another characterization living up to the new demands of the theories
of relativity in his mathematical analysis of the problem of space.27
But now, twenty years later, he wanted to go further. A bit earlier in his
talk he mentioned the idea that the Lorentz group might play its prominent
role for the physical automorphisms because it expresses deep lying matter
structures; but he strongly qualified the idea immediately after having stated
it:
Since we have the dualism of invariance with respect to two
groups and Ω certainly refers to the manifold of space points,
26Weyl explained this metaphorical description by what is now being called simple flag
transitivity: “any incident set of 1´, 2´, . . . , pn´1q´ dimensional directions can be carried
into any other such set by a suitable but uniquely determined element of the group” (Hs.
p. 22).
27 “I have given another characterization free from this blemish by showing that the
group of linear transformations that leave a non-degenerate quadratic form invariant is
the only one that ties affine connection to metric in the manner so characteristic for
Riemannian geometry and Einsteinian gravitation.” (Hs, p. 22) Cf. (Bernard 2015,
Scholz 2016a)
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it is a tempting idea to ascribe ∆o to matter and see in it a
characteristic of the localizable elementary particles of matter. I
leave it undecided whether this idea, the very meaning of which
is somewhat vague, has any real merits. (Hs, p. 19)
Coming closer to the end of his talk he indicated another, rather more
mathematical idea, even more abstract than his approach in the mathemat-
ical analysis of the space problem
. . . But instead of analysing the structure of the orthogonal group
of transformations ∆o, it may be wiser to look for a characteri-
zation of the group ∆o as an abstract group. Here we know that
the homogeneous n-dimensional orthogonal groups form one of
3 great classes of simple Lie groups. This is at least a partial
solution of the problem. (Hs, 22)
He left it open why it ought to be “wiser” to look for abstract structure
properties in order to answer a natural philosophical question. Could it be
that he wanted to indicate an open-mindedness toward the more structural-
ist perspective on automorphism groups, preferred by the young algebraists
around him at Princetion in the 1930/40s? Today the classification of simple
Lie groups distinguishes 4 series, Ak, Bk, Ck,Dk. Weyl apparently counted
the two orthogonal series Bk and Dk as one. The special orthogonal groups
in even complex space dimension form the series of simple Lie groups of type
Dk, with complex form SOp2k,Cq and real compact form SOp2k,Rq. The
special orthogonal group in odd space dimension form the series type Bk,
with complex form SOp2k ` 1,Cq and compact real form SOp2k ` 1,Rq.28
But even if one accepted such a general structuralist view as a starting
point there remained a question for the specification of the space dimension
of the group inside the series.
But the number of the dimensions of the world is 4 and not an
indeterminate n. It is a fact that the structure of ∆o is quite dif-
ferent for the various dimensionalities n. Hence the group may
serve as a clue by which to discover some cogent reason for the di-
mensionality 4 of the world. What must be brought to light, is the
distinctive character of one definite group, the four-dimensional
Lorentz group, either as a group of linear transformations, or as
an abstract group. (Hs, p. 22f.)
The remark that the “structure of ∆o is quite different for the various dimen-
sionalities n” with regard to even or odd complex space dimensions (type Dk,
28For the classification simple Lie algebras see any book on Lie algebras/groups; for the
complex case, e.g., (Knapp 1996), thms. 2.84, 2.111 (abstract classification and existence),
for a survey of the simple real Lie algebras chap. VI.10. A lucid exposition (in German)
gives (Brieskorn 1985, 501–513). Weyl had essentially contributed to the theory in his
book on the Classical Groups (Weyl 1938).
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resp. Bk) strongly qualifies the import of the general structuralist character-
ization. But already in the 1920s Weyl had used the fact that for the (real)
space dimension n “ 4 the universal covering of the unity component of the
Lorentz group SOp1, 3qo is the realification of SLp2,Cq. The latter belongs
to the first of the Ak series (with complex form SLpk`1,Cq). Because of the
isomorphism of the initial terms of the series, A1 – B1, this does not imply
an exception of Weyl’s general statement. We even may tend to interpret
Weyl’s otherwise cryptic remark that the structuralist perspective gives a “at
least a partial solution of the problem” by the observation that the Lorentz
group in dimension n “ 4 is, in a rather specific way, the realification of the
complex form of one of the three most elementary non-commutative simple
Lie groups of type A1 – B1.
29 Its compact real form is SOp3,Rq, respectively
the latter’s universal cover SUp2,Cq.30
Weyl stated clearly that the answer cannot be expected by structural
considerations alone. The problem is only “partly one of pure mathematics”,
the other part is “empirical”. But the question itself appeared of utmost
importance to him
We can not claim to have understood Nature unless we can es-
tablish the uniqueness of the four-dimensional Lorentz group in
this sense. It is a fact that many of the known laws of nature
can at once be generalized to n dimensions. We must dig deep
enough until we hit a layer where this is no longer the case. (Hs,
p. 23)
In 1918 he had given an argument why, in the framework of his new scale
gauge geometry, the “world” had to be of dimension 4. His argument had
used the construction of the Lagrange density of general relativistic Maxwell
theory Lf “ fµνf
µν
a
|detg|, with fµν the components of curvature of his
newly introduced scale/length connection, physically interpreted by him as
the electromagnetic field. Lf is scale invariant only in spacetime dimension
n “ 4.31 The shift from scale gauge to phase gauge undermined the im-
portance of this argument. Although it remained correct mathematically, it
lost its convincing power once the scale gauge transformations were relegated
from physics to the mathematical automorphism group of the theory only.
Weyl’s talk ended with the words:
Our question has this in common with most questions of philo-
sophical nature: it depends on the vague distinction between es-
29The other “most elementary” ones belong to the types C1, D2.
30See, e.g., (Brieskorn 1985, 512f.).
31Scale invariance of this Lagrange density presupposes that the lifting of indices for f
compensates the change of the
a
|detg| under rescaling. Counting the scale weight of the
metric gµν as 2, scale invariance of Lf holds if and only if ´4`
1
2
2n “ 0ÐÑ n “ 4, (Weyl
1918a, p. 31 (p. 37 in the English version)). Similarly for any Yang-Mills Lagrangian with
Lie algebra valued 2-form A, LYM “ ´
1
2
trpA^˚Aq “ ´ 1
4
Aµ1µ2A
µ1µ2
a
|g|dx1^ . . .^dxn.
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sential and non-essential. Several competing solutions are think-
able; but it may also happen that, once a good solution of the
problem is found, it will be of such cogency as to command gen-
eral recognition.
This kind of consideration was typical in its openness for his later, mature
way of reflecting.
8 Later developments and discussion
In his talk Weyl spanned a huge arc from classical geometry and physics until
the 20th century. By surveying this development he hoped to be able to iden-
tify criteria for the distinction between physical and mathematical aspects
in the automorphisms of the respective theories. In the first phase material
operations of solid bodies could be used for establishing the elementary basis
of congruence. They constituted the fundamental precondition for the pos-
sibility of stable trans-subjective measurements in the time from Newton to
about Helmholtz (section 2). With the shift towards the viewpoint of invari-
ance transformations of physical laws in the last third of the 19th century, a
weak extension by including orientation reversing isometries became neces-
sary. Although such transformations could no longer be realized by motions
of bodies, an aspect which had been observed in relational form already by
Kant, there still remained a chance for an indirect material re-modelling
of the additional transformations by mirror transformations and/or point
inversions.
On the other hand, mathematical automorphisms of classical geome-
try were generalized in different versions during the 19th century. Roughly
speaking they could be “any”, depending on the structure mathematicians
intended to study. Among these, so Weyl argued, the normalizer of physical
automorphisms played a distinguished role. Normalizer “in which group”?
Weyl may have thought of the general linear transformations or of the dif-
ferentiable bijective point transformations (diffeomorphisms) of space. In
the light of our context, the last interpretation seems more likely. But one
might also consider any normal extension appearing natural or promising,
by some criterion, as candidate for mathematical automorphisms associated
to a given physical automorphism group. The reason would be the same as
the one Weyl gave for similarities with regard to the congruence relation.
A normal extension is “conservative” with regard to the relations typical for
the physical automorphisms.
After the “shock of relativity” the structure of the physical automor-
phisms became that of a gauge group GpP q of a principal bundle over space-
time P ÑM with structure group ∆o “read off” from the then best available
theories of matter and its dynamics. For Weyl this was general relativity
(gravity and electromagnetism) combined with the Dirac theory of the elec-
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tron; then ∆o – SOp1, 3;RqˆUp1q or SLp2,CqˆUp1q. The invariance trans-
formations of the physical automorphism group were, in general, no longer
representable by material operations, in particular the diffeomorphisms of
spacetime. They now took on the form of mathematical transformations of
the theoretical structure designed for representing natural laws. A part of
the transformations, the “point dependent rotations”, however, could still be
interpreted physically in a wider sense, as transitions between families of
observer systems. In any case, the former clear distinction between math-
ematical and physical automorphisms became blurred. This point was not
discussed by Weyl. Most important for him was the difference which he
could now state between his 1918 scale gauge theory (“only mathematical”)
and 1929 phase gauge theory (part of “true” physics).
In hindsight Weyl’s 1948/49 discussion of the physical automorphisms
as a gauge group may appear as an anticipation of what was to become
a central paradigm for field physics in the last third of the 20th century.
Gauge theories gained wide recognition with the rise of the standard model
(SM) of elementary particle physics, from the 1970s onward. The physical
automorphisms of the SM is here again a gauge group G˜pPSM q, but now
considered over Minkowski space M of special relativity, PSM ÝÑ M. In
comparison with Weyl’s general relativistic group, the morphisms of the
base are reduced to the Poincaré transformations in M. In this way the
structure group of the SM is both, reduced and enlarged, in comparison
with the physical automorphisms of GR considered by Weyl:
– The morphisms of the base M “ M are no longer the full diffeomor-
phism group but are restricted to the linear transformations of the
Poincaré group. As a result the Lorentz transformations are no longer
“localized” but are considered as part of the “global” transformations
of M.
– On the other hand and most importantly, the remaining part of Weyl’s
structure group Up1q is extended to ∆˜o – SUp2qˆUp1qY ˆSUp3q (with
the electromagnetic Up1q as residuum after SUp2q symmetry breaking).
Moreover, the distinction between physical and mathematical aspects of
automorphisms have been undermined even deeper than in Weyl’s discussion:
There remains no chance for a material interpretation of the gauge trans-
formations of the SM, whereas for Weyl the change of orthonormal frames
was still interpretable – not realizable – as change between families of “local”
inertial observers.32
32Compare the discussion in present philosophy of physics on the “ontology” (the phys-
ical interpretation) of gauge transformations and the Higgs mechanism (Giulini 1996,
Earman 2002, Earman 2004, Lyre 2004, Healey 2007, Rovelli 2014, Friederich 2014b,
Friederich 2014a).
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There remains the problem of unifying the viewpoints of GR and the stan-
dard model of elementary particles in one coherent theoretical framework.
One of the different approaches to achieve this goal envisages a first step
towards an integration without a full quantization of gravity: the strategy
to formulate SM fields and their dynamics on “curved spaces” (i.e. Lorentz
manifolds).33 Although it is not explicitly discussed by the authors, their
work contains an underlying automorphism group of the theory GpP q with
full diffeomorphism group of the base manifold M . If one formulates their
theory in the orthonormal frame approach, the structure group becomes the
Lorentz group, or its universal covering, normally extended by the structure
group of the SM
G – SLp2,Cq ˆ SUp2q ˆ Up1qY ˆ SUp3q (2)
This perspective may even open a new look at Weyl’s scale invariance.
The Lagrangian of the standard model is basically scale invariant, its fields
are formulated scale covariantly and consistent with their import to scale
covariant GR. The only exception is the dimensionful coefficient µ of the
quadratic term µΦΦ˚ of the Higgs field Φ. But it is not difficult to bring
the latent scale covariance of the SM fields into the open by introduc-
ing a second, gravitational and real valued, scalar field φ of correct scale
weight such that µ “ µ˜φ2 with numerical coefficient µ˜. With regard to
“global” scale symmetries over Minkowski space this is being done, e.g., by
(Shapovnikov/Zenhäusern 2009). The scale symmetries are “localized” in
conformal approaches to SM fields like in and in those working in the frame-
work of Weyl geometry34. Inherent in this research is an extension of the
automorphism group of the theory to G˜pP q like above, but here with struc-
ture group
G˜ – R` ˆ SLp2,Cq ˆ SUp2q ˆ Up1qY ˆ SUp3q (3)
But has not such an approach already been refuted by Weyl’s argument
that quantum physics establishes an “absolute” standard of measurement?
– The answer is “no”, because the gravitational scalar field φ allows to form
scale invariant proportions of quantities which give rise to the measurement
values once the unities have been fixed. Moreover, in a particular scale gauge
(the one in which the norm of the scalar field is constant) measurement
values are expressed directly, up to a global normalization according to the
chosen unit. If one prefers one may describe it, metaphorically, as a kind of
“symmetry breaking” of scale symmetry by the gravitational scalar field.35
33E.g., (Fredenhagen e.a. 2007, Bär e.a. 2009).
34For the conformal view see, e.g., (Meissner/Nicolai 2009, Bars 2014), for the integrable
Weyl geometric one (Nishino/Rajpoot 2011, Nishino/Rajpoot 2007, Quiros 2014, Almeida
e.a. 2014, Scholz 2016b), for a non-integrable scale connection (Ohanian 2016).
35“Metaphorical” because no phase transition is involved (as far as we can see at
the moment) like in the usual understanding of “spontaneaous symmetry breaking”, cf.
(Friederich 2011).
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At the moment, the recent research line based on the Weyl geometric
approach explores mathematical models of gravity with or without stan-
dard model fields. As long as there are no striking physical consequences
deducible in this framework, which remain unexplained on the basis of Rie-
mann/Einstein gravity, one has to consider the group G˜pP q of this theory
as part of the mathematical automorphisms in Weyl’s language. But what,
if important empirical phenomena are better explained in this framework
than within the underlying Riemann geometric structure with automorphism
group GpP q? – Then we will be in a situation where the physical automor-
phisms of gravity plus SM fields are extended from GpP q to G˜pP q (with
structure group (3)) and Weyl’s scale extension, the point dependent “simi-
larities”, become part of the physical automorphism group again.
This might even give an unexpected and intriguing twist to Weyl’s final
question: Why does the Lorentz group play such a prominent role in the
structure group ∆o, and why n “ 4? As outlined above, his argument of 1918
for the 4-dimensionality of the “world”, the spacetime manifold of gravity plus
electromagnetism, did not depend on his specific physical interpretation of
the scale connection (Weyl’s ϕk) as the potential and the scale curvature (the
fµν) as the components of the Maxwell field. It is a structural property of the
scale invariance of the Lagrangian density, not only for the scale curvature
but for all Yang-Mills type Lagrange densities (see fn. 31). In particular,
the specification of dimension n “ 4 by the scale invariance condition of the
Lagrange density works independently of the physical interpretation of the
ϕk. If there are reasons to include the (localized) scale transformations in the
physical automorphism group again, Weyl’s argument for n “ 4 will acquire
new strength. Together with his observation of the striking simplicity of the
Lorentz group as one of the simplest simple Lie groups we may have the
impression that in following Weyl’s hints we can come a bit closer to having
“understood Nature” .
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